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This thesis examines the tradeoff between nonproliferation objectives and commercial
interests regarding controls on American exports of dual-use technologies. It also
examines the tension between both unilateral and multilateral export controls for
dual-use machine tools. Strong unilateral export controls reduce the competitiveness
of the U.S. machine tool industry, while relaxation of controls threatens to increase
the spread of weapons ofmass destruction by making enabling technologies available
to developing states. Given the increasing globalization of defense production,
multilateral export controls offer the best opportunity to retard the spread of sensitive
technologies, especially if these controls are led by a strong state that is prepared to
guide their implementation, verification, and enforcement. In order to influence the
behavior of target countries and to demonstrate American resolve for the principles
of nonproliferation, controls should include both sanctions and positive incentives.
The United States should lead multilateral export control regimes. If controls are
properly applied, opportunities for commercial exports may expand in the long term.
The case of Iraq provides important insights into the potential for nuclear and dual-
use technology proliferation in the absence of well-enforced controls. The study uses
the insights to argue for stronger controls, data-sharing, and monitoring to slow the
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The threat to U.S. interests of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) has increased during the post-Cold War era primarily due to the globalization of
defense technology industries. Diffusion of sensitive dual-use technologies, including
precision machine tools, enables more countries to produce WMD components and the
means for their delivery. Some dual-use technologies which were subject to controls
during the Cold War are now too widely available for U.S. controls to prevent their
emergence in new WMD programs. U.S. producers increasingly compete with foreign
suppliers of advanced dual-use items. In order to provide the U.S. military with the most
secure supply of advanced systems, these companies must remain competitive globally.
More than ever, national security policy makers must balance military threats to the United
States against the nation's economic security. Reform of U.S. unilateral export controls
and the establishment of a regime to succeed the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (COCOM) are necessary steps. But unilateral and multilateral controls
must complement each other to be effective in slowing the spread ofWMD programs.
This thesis examines the tradeoff between industrial competitiveness and non-
proliferation objectives. It develops a perspective toward export controls which balances
the concerns of exporters against those of proponents of stronger nonproliferation policies.
While the economy is becoming more global, the political orientation in the United
States is turning inward. Calls to retreat from international engagements in order to
pursue American national interests threaten the viability of any COCOM successor. This
IX
study argues that strengthening multilateral export controls serves American interests better
than relying on unilateral action. In the long-term, multilateral controls can slow the
spread of WMD while expanding markets for U.S. -made dual-use items.
The thesis focuses on the machine tool industry to clarify the issues raised by export
controls. Because of their key role in most manufacturing processes, machine tools are
critical capital equipment for industrialization. Their applicability to both military and
civilian manufacturing makes many machine tools dual-use. In particular, multi-axis,
computer numerically-controlled metal-cutting devices are essential in the production of
nuclear weapons materials, missiles, and advanced aircraft. It is in both the security and
the economic interests of the United States to maintain a competitive machine tool
production capability. Therefore, a study of the impact of controls on the U.S. machine
tool industry provides one means of evaluating export controls as a tool of foreign policy.
The best case available for examining the proliferation of WMD is Iraq. Since
1991, Iraq has been subjected to intrusive inspections of its WMD facilities and programs.
The inspections have yielded valuable information regarding international procurement
networks for sensitive technologies. International inspectors estimate that Iraq was only
a few years from building a nuclear weapon, and many dual-use machine tools may have
survived the war and the U.N. dismantling program. This thesis examines the role of the
United States and other technology suppliers in Saddam Hussein's WMD programs.
The thesis finds that export controls on dual-use technologies are losing their ability
to stem the spread of WMD, and that they are harmful to the relative competitiveness of
machine tool producers when applied unilaterally. Multilateral controls contributed to the
demise of the Soviet Union by denying the communist bloc critical capital equipment and
the means of matching the West militarily. However, without the bipolar international
system, the leadership role of the United States in multilateral regimes has changed and
international consensus for policy is more difficult to sustain. This thesis argues that the
United States, as the sole superpower, has the ability and resources to re-establish an
effective multilateral regime for controlling dual-use exports. Such a regime is in the
long-term interests of the United States, but would require a substantial political and
financial investment. The assessment of the costs and benefits of export controls has been
elusive because of inadequate accounting measures at both the U.S. government and
corporate levels. A better system of analyzing license application data, lost business
opportunities, and the returns to security from nonproliferation programs is needed to
weigh the value of controls. In addition, since export controls cannot prevent the spread
of sensitive technologies to states determined to acquire WMD, a better means of
monitoring technology diffusion is needed. This requires a complex information system
for data-sharing, pre-notification of shipment, end-user verification, and license denials.
The United States alone may have the intelligence resources and the power to
establish an effective system and enforce its rules. Prescriptions call for strong controls
on a limited list of sensitive technologies and firm policies against rogue behavior. The
United States must ensure positive incentives are included in the rules, as in the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, to draw states into a verifiable, cooperative posture with regard
to nonproliferation. Firm but fair leadership of multilateral efforts must reflect the
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A central goal of our national security strategy is to promote America's
prosperity through efforts both at home and abroad. Our economic and
security interests are increasingly inseparable. Our prosperity at home
depends on engaging actively abroad. The strength of our diplomacy, our
ability to maintain an unrivaled military, the attractiveness of our values
abroad — all these depend in part on the strength of our economy.
A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement
1
A. FRAMEWORK OF ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY
The current trend in U.S. politics is to restrict government involvement overseas. To
many Americans, U.S. support for supranational organizations such as the United Nations and
the World Trade Organization are a waste of national resources which could be put to better
use solving problems like crime or unemployment at home. Americans believe their national
defense at last safe; the new enemy to their well-being is the large budget deficit, which
threatens the nation's economic security, and an unnecessarily large government apparatus.
These legacies of the Cold War are the targets of an inwardly-focused Congress which, in
mid- 1995, pushes to cut foreign aid and agencies at an increasing rate.
However, the threat from the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD)
is increasing as defense production becomes more global. Controls on the transfers of
military and dual-use technologies are losing their effectiveness in preventing the spread of
WMD. The roles of multilateral export controls and of the United States in leading the
regimes have changed since the end of the Cold War. The multilateral regimes require
committed experts in the areas of commerce and security who work to slow proliferation of
lA National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, (Washington, DC: The
White House, February 1995), p. 19.
WMD, while supporting the prudent expansion of international trade. This paper argues that
the United States should build on the power it bought during the Cold War by strengthening
its leadership of multilateral regimes, and in particular the multilateral export control system.
This introductory chapter outlines the issues to be developed in later chapters
regarding nonproliferation and industrial competitiveness. It introduces the current dialog
about regimes of export controls of sensitive and dual-use technologies, covered more fully
in Chapt. II. It then describes export control regimes and arrangements and their influence
on trends in the machine tool industry in Chapt. III. Finally, it relates the lessons learned
about the failures of controls in the case of Iraq, which is discussed in detail in Chapt. IV.
As this thesis examines the tradeoff between nonproliferation policy and industrial
competitiveness, its purpose is to develop a perspective toward dual-use export controls
which seeks to balance the concerns of exporters with those of proponents of stronger
nonproliferation policies. The export control debate is politically-charged and fraught with
obstacles reflecting opposing value systems. This section frames the issues and arguments,
and develops the methodology to be followed in later chapters. The thesis asks the
following questions: 1) How does U.S. export control policy, including participation in
multilateral export control regimes, affect the competitiveness of the American dual-use
machine tool industry? 2) How does the competitiveness of U.S. machine tool firms impact
national security? 3) What are the proximate and ultimate national interests at stake?
B. THE NONPROLIFERATION-COMPETIITVENESS TRADEOFF
The control of sensitive and destabilizing weapons and technologies has long been a
keystone in U.S. national security policy. 2 However, these controls pose significant
tradeoffs. On the one hand, controls can help to keep weapons and enabling technologies
out of the hands of potential adversaries. This enhances U.S. national security. On the other
hand, controls of exports can reduce the profitability and competitiveness of American firms
by limiting potential markets. The controlled exporting firms either lose market share to
foreign competitors or lose the advantages of greater economies of scale. This can cost
Americans jobs and erode the vitality ofthe industrial base. In some strategic sectors, this too
could harm national security. 3
The control of exports of military technologies and materials involves this tradeoff.
However, it can be argued that the exporters who choose to do business in these sectors must
be willing to accept the costs of the inherent restrictions on their trade. Still, in the military
sectors, export controls are often offset by subsidies, large U.S. acquisition contracts, and
2For discussions of the importance of nonproliferation to U.S. security policy, see the
following: A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, (Washington, DC:The
White House, February 1995); Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, October 1993); and Kim R. Holmes, ed., A Safe andProsperous
America: A U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Blueprint, (Washington, DC: The Heritage
Foundation, June 1994).
3
Certain high technology industries, such as computer sectors, provide the U.S. military
with an important edge. Secretary of Defense Perry has argued for the Clinton Administration
that relaxing controls was justified to reduce burdens on these sectors, for which the military is an
important but not dominant customer. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy , OTA-ISS-596, (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, May 1994), p. 30. (This source is referred to as "OTA" in later
footnotes.)
other forms oftrade-distorting protectionism conducted in the interests of national security. 4
The tradeoff is more problematic when it involves "dual-use" items. Dual-use
technologies are those which have both military and civilian applications. In some cases, such
as in nuclear technologies, the need to control the spread of the military application is
apparent and broadly supported worldwide. 5 However, the legitimate application of nuclear
technology for peaceful energy programs is important to the economic development ofmuch
of the world. Economic development is in the interest of the United States when it means
expanded markets for American goods and services, enlargement of democratic movements
encouraged by economic empowerment, and the stabilization of friendly regimes in volatile
regions. The function of export controls is to limit the spread of military technologies, while
providing an environment where legitimate technological development of civilian sectors can
proceed. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) accomplishes this by providing for
nuclear technology transfer to developing nations which forego nuclear weapons programs.
The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency serve to verify compliance
through inspections and assistance.
One significant problem in dual-use technology exports is that there is no worldwide
4For an argument that protectionism may increase as the new international system sorts
itself out, see Steve Weber and John Zysman,"The Risk That Mercantilism Will Define the Next
Security System" in Wayne Sandholtz et al., The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of
the Next Security System, Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE), (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 167-196.
5Agreement was reached at the 1995 conference to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) indefinitely. Though driven by different issues than the nuclear treaty, conventions
focusing on biological and chemical weapons resulted in similarly broad support for the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
4
consensus on what should be controlled. The debate quickly turns to technical descriptions
ofthe degree of precision and the extent of process technology required to produce weapons
of mass destruction (e.g., in the production of weapons-grade fissionable material) or their
delivery systems (missiles, artillery shells, bombs, or aircraft). 6 The U.S. Department of
Commerce, which administers export controls through its Bureau ofExport Administration
(BXA), employs a Commerce Control List (CCL) to categorize items deemed sensitive in
both multilateral regimes and in unilateral U.S. policies. 7 This list is constantly the subject of
debate between firms trying to increase their exports, and other groups which perceive that
loopholes allow rogue states to acquire sensitive items. 8 The former want the list reduced,
while the latter groups push for expanded and stricter restrictions.
6The technical debates rage within the United States as well. For a summary ofmany key
issues raised at a workshop held at Stanford University, October 18-19, 1993, see Cameron
Binkley and John R. Harvey, Export Controls on Dual-Use, High Technology: Implicationsfor
National/Economic Security, A Working Paper of the Center for International Security and Arms
Control, (Stanford University, December 1993).
'Determining which technologies are destabilizing and why has been problematic because
of the rapid developments in automation, telecommunications, guidance systems, and many other
fields which are critical for strategic and tactical military advantage. For a list of categories, see
Critical Technologies Plan, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, ES-2, 15 March 1991),
and Rep. Tim Valentine, Critical Technology: OSTP Report, (Washington, DC: Congress, House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and
Competitiveness, 102nd Congress, 1st sess. 25 April 1991).
8The Association of Manufacturing Technologies is an example of a group lobbying for
looser controls. It is the national trade association for the U.S. machine tool industry.
Institutions in government and academia which analyze security issues tend to advocate strong
controls. Examples are the BXA, the Office of the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs (currently headed by Lynn Davis), and the Monitoring Proliferation
Threats Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
C. EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
Advanced technologies are controlled both to retain American competitive advantage and
to retard proliferation. During the Cold War, controls were a tool of economic statecraft to
guarantee Western technological superiority over the communists. Following WW n, the
West established COCOM. It served two security functions: it made key technologies for
the production of threatening weapons unavailable to communist states; and it withheld
machines necessary for the communist states' economic development.9
COCOM achieved general consensus among Western industrial states because of the clear
bipolar international system. The various participants in the regime were generally able to
cooperate despite having divergent national agendas. Under American leadership, the regime
ultimately succeeded in speeding the demise ofthe Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union's economic
system could not compensate for its technological isolation from the global capitalist market. 10
The Soviet Union's collapse vindicated COCOM, but it also made the regime irrelevant.
COCOM became obsolete as the West began to welcome the former Eastern bloc into the
global market economy. Therefore in March 1994, COCOM ended. The members are
reassessing the need for controls on new lists of dual-use technologies whose spread threatens
international security. The new regime involves participation from the former Eastern bloc. 11
9Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: COCOMand the Politics ofExist-West
Trade. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 64.
10
National Academies of Sciences and Engineering, Institutes of Medicine, Finding
Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in Changed Global Environment (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 61-105.
nOTA, 1994, p. 49.
The United States participates in several multilateral regimes which focus on curbing the
proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, including the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (focusing on chemical and biological
weapons), and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). They remain in force because their
nonproliferation aims and requirements are less contentious than the rules for dual-use items. 12
The leadership of the United States in the multilateral regimes is often reflected in the
manner that the international controls resemble U.S. unilateral efforts. Proponents of
unilateral controls cite that the principles ofAmerican nonproliferation policy formed the basis
of COCOM's and the other regimes' effectiveness. In the bipolar world, U.S. allies either
concurred with the wisdom of controls, or the United States pressured them to cooperate. 13
cc-'"
In the absence of multilateral consensus, the United States continues to employ diverse
means of export control. An example of other unilateral means of controls involving foreign
policy is the President's use of executive orders, such as the recent decision by President
Clinton to block Conoco's development of off-shore oil fields for Iran. 14
12OTA, 1994, pp.4-5.
13For examples of the effects of U.S. leadership, see the following: "The United States
and Multilateral Export Control Regimes," Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of
U.S. National Security Export Controls, (National Academies of Sciences and Engineering,
Institutes of Medicine), Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global
Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 61-105; also Michael
Mastanduno, "U.S. Leadership and the Struggle to Strengthen COCOM, 1981-89, in
Mastanduno, Economic Containment: COCOM and the Politics ofEast-West Trade, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1992), chapter 8.
14The problematic aspect of having a broad range of unilateral options is that some may
undermine others. For example, a punitive sanction against Iran which aims at denying them
access to civilian nuclear technology for energy reactors contrasts with simultaneous efforts to
give North Korea nuclear technology to "civilianize" its nuclear program.
D. UNILATERALISM AND MULTILATERALISM
Simply blocking exports of destabilizing American technologies is an effective means of
controlling proliferation when alternative sources are not available. Unilateral export controls
are sufficient in such cases. However, in today's global economy, technology diffuses rapidly
via Multinational Corporations (MNCs), joint ventures, offsets linked to licensing deals,
reverse engineering, scientist exchanges, and by many other means. States seeking WMD can
turn to non-U. S. sources for technical items and expertise. Thus for most technologies,
unilateral U.S. export controls are of limited effectiveness in restricting access to items. In
these situations, multilateral arrangements or regimes limit availability of items much better.
Two of the disadvantages of multilateralism are: 1) the large political and financial
investment required to achieve international consensus and effective enforcement of controls;
2) the loss of sovereignty involved with any binding transnational regime. These problems
will be discussed in more detail in Chapt. III.
E. U.S. I f AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
'
The U.S. willingness to lead a multilateral effort to control the spread of sensitive
technology reflects the importance it ascribes to this facet of nonproliferation. The question
of export controls is a question of national interest. As the sole superpower in the
international system, the United States wields considerable influence. This study assumes the
United States can lead a multilateral effort to legislate policy which coincides with its national
interests. An alternative assumption is that there is enough inertia in the system to support
multilateral control regimes without a clear hegemon. However, the longevity of this
arrangement depends on the "residue of common interests or social purposes among the
dominant powers." 15 At the very least, the United States has to work beside the emerging
powers to ensure our common interests are not compromised. 16
The U.S. national interests at stake in the dual-use export control debate are complex.
The long-term issues at stake when considering the spread of technology and WMD are:
regional stability, threats to allies, collective security, open lines of communication and
commerce, U.S. access to export markets and strategic resources, and democratization led
by economic development. 17 Government spending trends, presented in Chapt. IV, suggest
15Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy ofInternational Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987) p. 79.
16The leadership of the United States is a stabilizing influence for the international system,
and critical for the functioning of international regimes according to the theory of hegemonic
stability. This theory was initially expressed by Charles Kindleberger, who argued that hegemonic
leadership is essential to a stable world order. See Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in
the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides," International Studies
Quarterly (Summer 1981),Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 242-254.
17For a structured treatment of U.S. national interests, see Holmes, 1994. pp. 5-12.
changes in the government's support of the machine tool industry over time. This reflects the
relative importance the U.S. government placed on the industry under various export control
regimes and political climates since World War H, and earlier.
F. THE U.S. MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY
The U.S. machine tool industry is relatively small, following a long period of decline and
a shift in leadership to Japan and Germany. Even with less than $4 billion in total sales
industry-wide, this sector has often drawn the attention of analysts and policy-makers as a
"critical technology industry." 18 Machine tools are necessary for the production of other tools
and product-forming equipment (such as molds for plastic goods) which drive most other
manufacturing processes. Advances in machine tools lead directly to innovations in
manufacturing technologies along the spectrum of civilian and military industries. Therefore
the health of the machine tool industry affects the health of a very broad industrial base. 19
Policy-makers recognize that foreign machine tool producers do not export their most
advanced and innovative designs for one and a half to two years after marketing them
domestically. This provides the foreign producers closer access to customers in order to
"debug" the new product lines. The subsequent lag to U.S. industries which depend on
imported technology has a profound and cascading affect on their ability to innovate
processes. The result is a weakening of U.S. manufacturing competitiveness relative to the
18See David Finegold et al., The Decline of the U.S. Machine-Tool Industry andProspects
for Its Sustainable Recovery, Vol. I ( Santa Monica: Rand, 1994), p. 1.
19James Mack, Vice President, Government Relations, Association for Manufacturing
Technology, McLean, Virginia. Telephone interview. March 14, 1995.
10
foreign firms. 20 Since the national defense is intimately related to technological advantage,
it can be concluded that weakness in the U.S. machine tool industry carries strong
implications for national security.
The U.S. government has long supported research and development in machine tool
technology to guarantee capacity for war. However, the government's efforts were
insufficient to prevent a rapid erosion of the domestic machine tool industry in the 1980s as
both demand and imports surged. Recent analyses suggest that the remaining U.S. machine
tool producers are highly competitive, but there are still structural weaknesses in the industry.
These weaknesses warn that the United States may have trouble sustaining a superior defense
production base without more and better machine tool makers. 21
The pattern of demand and sales of machine tools has followed the cycles of military
conflict since WWI. War creates huge demand for machines for precision milling, grinding,
boring, chucking, and lathing. While the Department ofDefense buys some machines, most
are purchased during the boom cycles by defense contractors. When the conflict subsides,
demand falls. The fluctuation is cited as one of the major reasons for the decline in the
American machine tool industry, because firms dependent on domestic sales failed to sustain
operations in the peacetime market. 22 The dependence of the machine tool industry on
military spending cycles was not as dramatic in Japan and Germany, where defense spending
represented a smaller fraction ofthe GDP after WWII than in the United States. Government
20
Finegold et al., 1994, p.2.
21




spending policies in the United States tried to adjust for the effect of the business cycle by
sustaining a permanent war economy after the Korean conflict. However, U.S. firms still did
not generate enough civilian demand during subsequent recessionary periods. Machine tool
demand was also hurt by competition from post-conflict sales of used military tool
inventories. Thus analysts conclude that the Keynesian-military spending efforts to regulate
business cycles and machine tool demand had a counterproductive effect on industry
competitiveness. 23
Concern for the competitiveness of the sector focused on support of research and
development. The government historically funded independent industrial R&D only if it was
directly applicable to a defense mission. With the National Cooperative Research Act of
1 984, the government established funding for consortia of companies to develop basic
technologies. One of these consortia is the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences
(NCMS), which includes machine tool companies. Among their cooperative projects is
advanced research on computer numerically-controlled (CNC) machines. 24
G. MACHINE TOOLS AND EXPORT CONTROLS
While they comprise an important political tool , strong U.S. export controls are cited
as the most important external obstacle to machine tool exports. Strict regulations, enforced
by a "decentralized, uncoordinated interagency bureaucracy", have impeded foreign sales. 25
23Anthony DiFilippo, Military Spending and Industrial Decline: A Study of the American
Machine Tool Industry (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 9.
24
Finegold et al., 1994, p. 101.
25
Finegold et al., 1994, p. 69.
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Industry officials complain that the real problem is that the playing field is not level While
Japan, Germany, and most other industrialized states limit exports based on COCOM
commodity control lists, the United States imposes additional controls based on more
restrictive interpretations of the rules and on a series of export administration acts. Because
ofthe distinct manner in which the United States adheres to the multilateral rules, the industry
officials refer to the American government's attitude as "accidental unilateralism."26
Looser interpretations of the rules by the Germans and Japanese have resulted in those
two countries' strong sales figures to the Soviet Union and China, respectively. 27 This
occurred during the 1980s, when COCOM restrictions against Communist states were still
in effect. The exports supported those countries' machine tool sales while the U.S. industry
was in steep decline.
28
Also, the process of reviewing requests for export licenses usually takes six to nine
months (and often up to a year) in the United States, while it takes only weeks or days in
Japan, Germany, and other machine tool exporting countries. Those countries enforce the
COUf-'
multilateral rules much more quickly, and as a result win overseas contracts away from U.S.
firms. Brian McCloud of Fadal Engineering declared that the red tape involved in the
licensing process has dissuaded him from seeking overseas sales in most cases. He claims his
company would expand exports overnight if the licensing process were no more cumbersome
26Mack, 1995, and Brian McCloud, Director, Sales & Distribution, Fadal Engineering
Co., Inc. Chatsworth, California, Telephone interview, March 14, 1995.
27See Finegold et al., 1994, pp.70-71, Figs. 4.22, 4.23.
28Finegold et al., 1994, p. 70.
13
than it is for his competitors in Japan. The United States requires requests to be reviewed by
numerous sub-agencies within the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy.
The license requirement and accompanying review process apply to all machine tools sold
overseas, regardless of sophistication.
A Rand study has recommended an overhaul of the license review process to reflect the
current real, es of international politics and global economic competition. 29 Ways to
streamline the procedure include eliminating controls on less advanced machines and
instituting a time limit for licensing. The latter measure forces the Department of Commerce
to provide timely reasons why sales should not proceed. Special Agent Randall Sike30
believes the regulations are already written more in favor of dual-use exporters than to
support nonproliferation policies. He also believes the Clinton Administration supports
business interests at least as much as previous Republican administrations did. 31
While this view is shared by James Mack of the Association of Manufacturing
Technologies32
,
he believes the advantages of support from the Administration are enjoyed
by the telecommunications and computer sectors, but not by the machine tool producers. 33
James Mack argues that the unilateral export control policies of the United States have
29
Finegold, p. 125.
30Of the San Jose Branch of the Bureau of Export Enforcement.
31
Randall S. Sike, Special Agent In Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of
Export Enforcement. Interview. San Jose, California. February 24, 1995.
32The national trade association for the machine tool industry; it was formerly known as
the National Machine Tool Builders' Association.
33Mack, 1995.
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only harmed U.S. exporters. He reports seeing precise 5-axis CNC machine tools on display
by foreign companies at trade shows in China. The trde laws of the United States prohibit
the export of 5-axis tools because they are deemed to provide greater capability to produce
WMD components and materials, but they are clearly available on the international market. 34
Brian McCloud explains that most U.S. producers support restricting access of the sensitive
technology to "rogue" states, but the U.S. laws block a much larger target market. He
believes this market is wide open to foreign producers. 35 Mack and McCloud concur that the
policies of U.S. agencies are in conflict. They citeas an example the case in which
McDonnell-Douglas' advanced aircraft are being sold under U.S. government-supported
license to China, which is already a nuclear power, while the machine tools used for building
and servicing aircraft parts are being blocked. 36 Such barriers to the tool exports appear to
serve no purpose for nonproliferation, since both WMD and aircraft delivery systems are
otherwise available to the Chinese.
H. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR PROGRESS
The most fruitful way to implement export controls on dual-use machine tools may be to
provide positive incentives and opportunities to the economic sectors affected. Straight
compensation to exporters for losses of sales is not feasible, since no government can afford
to make such payments, and because the determination of pecuniary loss would involve





and allow entrepreneurs to continue with business.
For example, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, operating under NPT guidelines, provides for
the transfer ofnuclear energy technology to states for peaceful purposes if they comply with
nonproliferation rules. That is, states are rewarded with technology if they do not engage in
nuclear weapons programs or re-export the technology to states which might try to develop
weapons. This is a powerful incentive for countries which need technology transfer for
economic development to comply with NPT guidelines. 37
The same system of positive incentives is feasible for dual-use items. Furthermore, it
involves a broader group of states. The demand for precision machine tools is greater than
for nuclear technologies, and there is a larger pool of source countries. The difficulty in
implementing such a system is in administering the "end-user" procedures. Recipient states
and exporters must guarantee the technology will not be used for military (especially WMD)
purposes or be re-exported to states deemed to be likely to engage in WMD development.
This process is extremely difficult to enforce. It requires a bureaucracy of inspectors as well
as a system of information-sharing across national agencies and international borders, and a
fair system of enforcement sanctions.
So far, the requirements listed have been obstacles preventing the positive-incentive
approach from being widely applied. Instead, attention has focused on building "higher walls
around fewer items." 38 The United States has not yet been able to assemble a list of items
37OTA, 1994, p. 43.
38That is, tighter export restrictions on a shorter list of commodities and technologies.
Sike, 1995.
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it most wishes to control. As a result, it has not been able to guide the international
negotiations for a COCOM successor effectively. 39 In the absence of a clear list of
destabilizing items and a classification system based on objective criteria, the United States
may be cautiously controlling too much. The result is excessive damage to our domestic
industry and a weakened U.S. posture at the multilateral bargaining table. 40
The benefits to international security of working through export control negotiations are
potentially enormous. If the end-user system is improved and strengthened, it could bolster
the integrity of supplier-recipient relationships. As a result, the potential markets for U.S.
machine tool exporters might open and expand rapidly. As machine tool sales increase, so
does general economic development. This eventually leads to the expansion of more markets
overseas. The United States is well-positioned to profit from this expansion, hence our own
industries and economy will grow.
Since the system of end-user verification is based on the voluntary eschewing ofWMD
by developing states, they may be more willing to turn to collective security regimes in order
to stabilize their regional status. These states may pursue legitimate conventional weapons
programs to provide for their security, which will leads to increased U.S. conventional arms
sales and technology offset arrangements. The web of interdependence of states expands in
such a scenario, with the United States in a favorable leadership position. This increases the
39Mack, 1995. Mack refers to this as a search for the correct "modalities."
40Mack, 1995.
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global influence of the United States, and decreases the likelihood of large-scale conflict. 41
The system described above, beginning with export controls and leading to an expansion
of trade, is based on positive incentives for both the suppliers and buyers. The system
requires a great degree of transparency to ensure end-user compliance. Such transparency
requires a sophisticated infrastructure of information-sharing and enforcement. Currently,
most countries do not have the intelligence and automation assets to implement this type of
export control system. 42 The United States would have to take the lead to establish
infrastructure in many countries. It has already provided for an expanded database to monitor
NSG activities, and can build on the effort for monitoring dual-use transfers. 43
The long-term effects of such cooperative trade policies and technology transfer can build
on themselves. As transparency, confidence, and development increase, so can security and
investment. With greater security, political risk to business ventures decreases, and people
may find more opportunities to translate improved economic status into political participation,
thus "enlarging" democracy.
Obviously the reform of machine tool export controls will not solve all of this by itself.
It is one important step in an international trade strategy of stability requiring a strong
superpower/hegemon. Part of this prescription is the need for smart negotiating. James
Mack points out that the United States is not negotiating like a hegemon. He cited a case in
41
"Cooperating" states will be less inclined to alienate the United States and the world
community through aggressive acts, and "rogue" states will be deterred from projecting force by
the prospect of opposing large international coalitions on the battlefield.
42OTA, 1994, p. 5.
43OTA, 1994, p. 5.
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which Lynn Davis, Undersecretary of State for nonproliferation, entered negotiations for the
successor regime to COCOM by declaring the U.S. has given up the right to a veto. Then
she requested that the other countries concede on U.S. proposals for preshipment notification.
They refused. While her efforts may have been principled, her tactics were weak, and the
committee lost respect for U.S. leadership. 44
I. THE CASE OF IRAQ
The arguments of this study can be applied very well in the case of Iraq. Under the
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has sought preeminence in the Gulf region. Saddam has
pursued WMD programs vigorously as a means to bolster security against real and perceived
threats from Iran, Syria, and Israel. He also wants the power and prestige a WMD capability
confers, in order to strengthen his bid to become the pan-Arab leader. Therefore, as a case
of a state engaged in proliferation ofWMD, Iraq provides valuable insights into both the
need for export controls and their weaknesses.
Saddam's early efforts to acquire nuclear weapons involved the 1976 purchase of a French
research reactor, installed at Osiraq. International outcry halted the initial contract for the
French to transfer 72 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to Iraq. This blocked transfer
fueled Saddam's desire to establish an indigenous enrichment capability. His plans to build
WMD in Iraq required advanced machine tools and centrifuges. 45
44Mack, 1995.
45
Suspected Mossad interventions terminated a 1979 transfer of a French reactor core and
the life of an Egyptian nuclear scientist working for Saddam in Paris. In 1981, after Iran failed in
its raid against the facility at Osiraq, the Israeli air force bombed the reactor. See Ephraim Karsh
and I. Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London: Brassey's (UK), 1991), pp. 126-
128.
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Saddam's WMD programs accelerated during the 1980s, primarily aided by French and
German technologies. Financially, Iraq was helped by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
members and by the Atlanta office of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL). Political
support for the arming of Iraq came from the governments of the West and of the GCC,
which regarded Saddam as the key line of defense against a revolutionary and expansionist
Iran. The combination of these factors, together with a global procurement network,
undermined existing military and dual-use export controls. The result was that Iraq developed
and deployed chemical weapons against Iran and against its own Kurdish minority population,
and it came dangerously close to building a nuclear weapon.
On August 2 and 9, 1990, immediately following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, U.S.
Executive Orders prohibited transactions with Iraq. Like Iran and Syria, Iraq is listed as "a
nation that has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism."46 During the inspections
and investigations conducted in accordnce with the terms of the 1990-91 GulfWar cease fire
and U.N. resolutions, the importance of machine tools to the Iraqi WMD development effort
became clearer. The diffusion of machine tools and technology resulted from violation and
misapplication of export controls, and from legal transfers that violated the spirit of
46See the Export Administration Bulletin 282, "Special Country Policies and Provisions",
section 785.4, October 1994: "Pursuant to Executive Orders 12722 and 12724 of August 2 and
August 9, 1990, respectively, the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign assets Control
(OFAC) has published regulations prohibiting transactions with the government of , and persons
in, Iraq. The Iraqi Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. section 575.205 of January 18, 1991)
provide that 'no goods, technology (including technical data or other information), or services
from the United States or, if subject to U.S. jurisdiction, exported or reexported from a third
country to Iraq, to any entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iraq,' except as
otherwise authorized. Absent any required OFAC license, no BXA general license or other
authorization may be used for export to Iraq. An authorization from OFAC shall also constitute
authorization under the Export Administration Regulations."
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onproliferation. Chapter V examines the special case of Iraq in detail, focusing on lessons
learned for dealing with other rogues in the region.
J. SUMMARY AND METHODOLOGY
The debate over export controls of dual-use technologies involves many core concerns
for U.S. national security. Nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, industrial
competitiveness and defense preparedness, the economic welfare of Americans, collective
security and multilateral ordering regimes, and the sorting out of friends from rogues ~ all
strain the intellectual and material resources of the U.S. security apparatus. As with most
domestic and foreign policies, progress in reforming export controls depends on applying a
coherent and principled approach. Today, multilateral control regimes are not only
prescribed, they are indispensable. But international consensus will come only if the United
States leads the way. We cannot abdicate leadership without paying high costs in the long-
term As leaders, Americans must understand the critical roles of the other major industrial
powers in the system — namely Germany (and the European Union), Japan, and Russia— and
must work to integrate China, India, and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). Rogues
must be dealt with firmly, but also in a fair way if the United States intends to bring them
around someday to join the cooperative regime. The essence of hegemonic power is to make
national interests and global interests coincide. Dual-use machine tool export control policy
offers the United States another opportunity to assert its leadership.
In this introductory chapter, the framework of the basic arguments and issues are spelled
out briefly. Some of the arguments lead to policy prescriptions. They attempt to reconcile
opposing viewpoints and take advantage of the common ground in order to enhance both
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national security and industrial viability. The relationship between the dual-use machine tool
industry and unilateral and multilateral export controls fuels the debate on nonproliferation
and national security policy. This section attempts to clarify the relationship and establish
a methodology for the thesis.
The thesis examines the tradeoffbetween industrial competitiveness and nonproliferation
objectives. Its purpose is to develop a manner of thinking about export controls which
balances the concerns of exporters with those of proponents of stronger nonproliferation
policies.
The means of achieving that perspective is by examining the merits of unilateral and
multilateral dual-use export controls as policy tools to enhance U.S. national security and
economic security interests. In this examination, the objective is to identify the problems of
measuring costs and benefits ofvarious export control arrangements, and to suggest ways to
improve the government's and exporters' means for evaluating controls more objectively.
The study focuses on the dual-use machine tool industry to clarify issues raised by export
controls. Dual-usemachine tools are critical to both the U.S. defense apparatus and to the
U.S. manufacturing base. It is in both the security and economic interests of the United
States to maintain a competitive machine tool production capability. Therefore the study of
the impact of controls on the U.S. machine tool industry provides one means of
evaluatingexport controls as a tool of industrial and foreign policy.
The research considers cases of technology transfers to sensitive countries in the Middle
East. To focus, the special case of Iraq is examined. Iraq is of singular value in the dialog
on export controls because of the following factors: 1) it is one of a small number of
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internationally recognized "rogue" states; 2) it pursued a vigorous program of developing
WMDs in spite of multilateral control efforts designed to hinder it; 3) it is now subjected to
extremely intrusive international inspections which reveal valuable information about its
procurement efforts; 4) Iraq, as well as its regional rival Iran, may intend to continue to
pursue WMD programs to change the balance of power in the sensitive Gulf region.
Following the discussion of the case of Iraq, the findings of the study and policy
prescriptions are described in Chapter V.
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II. EXPORT CONTROLS AND DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES
...a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of [weapons
of mass destruction] and to develop an effective capability to deal with these
threats...we also support improved export controls for nonproliferation
purposes both domestically and multilaterally.
A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement47
A. INTRODUCTION
Almost by definition, "nonproliferation" requires restrictions, i.e., controls, on the
diffusion of sensitive items, systems, and technologies. Many analysts argue convincingly that
export controls have lost a great deal of effectiveness since the end of the Cold War in the
globalization of the defense industry. 48 However, as long as proliferation ofWMD tops the
list of threats to U.S. interests, export controls will be one of the policy tools used to slow
WMD spread. Effectiveness depends on "the characteristics of the weapons of concern, the
capabilities of the target countries and programs, the controllability of the designated
commodities and technology, the degree of international cooperation, and the quality of
enforcement."49
In most cases, controls represent a delay designed to allow implementation of other
nonproliferation policy tools. In cases involving dual-use technologies, the trend will be to
41A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, (Washington, DC: The
White House, February 1995), pp. 13-14.
48See David Mussington, Arms Unbound, 1994, p. 80, and Lieutenant Daniel M. Green,
Monitoring Technology Proliferation: An Open Source Methodologyfor Generating
Proliferation Intelligence, Master of Arts Thesis, (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School,
December 1993), pp. 5-6.
49OTA 1994, p. 1.
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identify the most sensitive dual-use commodities to WMD production and to apply the
strongest controls possible. Meanwhile, most transfers oftechnology falling under the various
multilateral or unilateral control arrangements will be monitored more closely to expose
potential WMD proliferation activity. 50 The increasingly difficult task is designing controls
that serve both security and economic interests.
B. EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES AND ARRANGEMENTS
There have been many multilateral and unilateral attempts to deal with the problem of
proliferation. During the Cold War, the West formed COCOM, the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls, to restrict the transfer of threatening technology to the
communists and their client states. This arrangement was managed primarily by the G7
countries, who are now engaged in negotiations for a successor regime. The successor must
be more relevant to the new purposes of controls given the collapse of communism. The
successor may be revised to cover lists of products and technologies not covered in other
multilateral regimes which deal specifically with WMD and missiles. The current concern is
to ensure the COCOM successor does not undermine the consensus built in those other
regimes. The lists of controlled items may be short and specific to speed consensus and
ratification, and may focus on the question of dual-use machines and technologies. 51 The
successor regime is to bring in as new members such supplier states as Russia and China,
whose exports could seriously hamper efforts to slow the spread ofWMD. Failure by the
50See Daniel M. Green, Monitoring Technology Proliferation, for a proposal to increase
the use of commercial information networks to aid in the tracking ofWMD proliferation activity.
51OTA, 1994, p. 4.
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former COCOM members to include them could be interpreted as a ploy to block them from
cooperative trade arrangements, or as a U.S. -led effort to protect American competitiveness.
The United States must be careful to emphasize that the true aims of nonproliferation
agreements are to maximize international security. Thus it becomes a question of American
political credibility and good faith to involve the Russians and Chinese. 52
The former COCOM countries have indicated that COCOM's successor regime will
include Russia and the other Eastern European states as founding members. It will be open
to all countries which endorse non-proliferation norms and adhere to existing export control
regimes other than COCOM. 53 The member countries must agree to implement an effective
domestic export control system. The targets of the Forum will be states which refuse to sign
on to nonproliferation norms or otherwise exhibit undesirable behavior. 54
Coordination among members of multilateral export control regimes will depend upon
communication and information sharing. Once the member nations have demonstrated their
willingness to restrict threatening transfers, often at great cost to their exporting companies,
the key to success will be the efficient passing of information. The United States has taken
the lead in establishing a computer-based network for the members of the Nuclear Suppliers'
Group (NSG). The NSG has agreed to common export control policies for nuclear and
""Meeting On Rocket Technology, Dual-Purpose Knowledge Export," Central Eurasia,
January 4, 1993, p. 27.
53The members want to avoid undermining consensus built in the other regimes.
54For example, by sponsoring terrorism.
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dual-use technologies. 55 Members share information about export license requests, approvals
and denials, and end-user data. This network assists member countries which cannot afford
extensive intelligence resources to support their export control programs. By raising
awareness throughout the system, it strengthens barriers to the spread ofWMD.
Similar networks will be extended to members of the Australia Group and the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Australia Group is a multilateral arrangement
focusing on chemical and biological weapons proliferation, while the MTCR focuses on
ballistic missiles. Each of these two arrangements is concerned with an extensive array of
dual-use technology. There is heavy pressure from industry on these regimes to relax
restrictions and permit more exports, ostensibly for legitimate civilian projects.
The United States is continuing to refine its unilateral export control measures as well.
The Bush administration tightened export controls under the Enhanced Proliferation Control
Initiative (EPCI). The EPCI reviewed licenses for WMD technologies, placing what U.S.
industry complained was an unfair burden on American exporters. 56 The Clinton
Administration has been clarifying EPCI rules in a manner which is friendlier to industry, with
the intent of harmonizing license review procedures with provisions of the multilateral
agreements. The Administration's interpretations and provisions for controls and sanctions
are spelled out in its draft Export Administration Act of 1994 (EAA). The major areas of
concern in current U.S. unilateral efforts are the assessment and balancing of industrial costs
with security goals, and the provisions for timely review of export requests by all appropriate
55OTA, 1994, p. 5.
56OTA, 1994, p. 8.
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Administration and Congressional agencies.
Unilateral controls are proving to be of reduced effectiveness in the post-Cold War era.
The evolution in the structure of the international marketplace degrades the effectiveness of
controls by making technology diffusion much easier. Multinational or transnational
corporations (MNCs) disseminate the results of research and development, often to the
countries outside of control regimes.
Those who argue for strong unilateral U.S. controls even in the presence of foreign
availability, do so to strengthen other foreign policy efforts. The resolve of the United States
in upholding principles of nonproliferation and terrorism provides leadership in world affairs.
Other suppliers may be influenced to cooperate with U.S. policies in seeking changes in the
behavior of target states.
Harvey et al. studied three cases of U.S. unilateralism: the Iran embargo and its impact
on sales of commercial airliners, the "catch-all" provision of the Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative, and stringent U.S. sanctions under the MTCR. In each case, the group
found U.S. unilateralism to be counterproductive to overall economic and foreign policy
interests. They recommended no further unilateral controls on dual-use items for which the
U.S. is not the sole supplier.
57 They recognized that sometimes unilateralism follows political
necessity, but they advocated including "sunset provisions" in such instances unless the
controls become multilateral. This would entail periodic reviews of the controls. Harvey's
team recommended revision or elimination of the EPCI, as well as broader discretion to the
President to impose sanctions and to allow or ban specific exports to specific end-users,
"Harvey et al., 1995, p. xi.
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according to national security or economic conditions. 58
With regard to unilateral efforts, Harvey's group recommends that the U.S. should seek
multilateral participation before imposing an embargo. Among the possibilities for trade
sanctions, the United States could block imports from target countries or regions, especially
when alternative sources of the imported goods are available.
With regard to multilateral export controls, Harvey's group predicts a continuing but
weakened role for controls under the successor regime to COCOM, referred to as "The New
Forum". These controls may be oriented exclusively toward nonproliferation goals, rather
than toward other foreign or commercial policy objectives. This reflects that the most
important goal to the New Forum is the controlling ofthe transfer of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium, including the means of their production. 59
C. THE U.S. EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM SIMPLIFIED
Congress is reviewing legislation reforming the Export Administration Act (EAA). It
gives the executive branch the most discretion among the U.S. government bodies in imposing
controls, including broad powers ofenforcement. The export administration act provides the
key guidelines for licenses of dual-use exports. All U.S. exports require a license, indicating
that exporting from the United States is more a privilege than a right. Most exports can be
exported under a "general license". The Commerce Department's Bureau of Export
58Harvey et al., 1995, p. xii.
59For example, the means of producing these fissionable materials include CNC machine
tools and gas centrifuges.
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Administration (BXA) regulates the licensing process.60
EAA authorizes Commerce to maintain Export Administration regulations (EAR) which
contains the Commerce Control List (CCL). It is the exporter's responsibility to determine
what licenses and procedures are appropriate and through which agencies they must apply.
Controls are applied based on three factors: (1) the item's technical characteristics; (2)
whether the export is equipment, a material, production-related information, or software61
;
(3) the item's destination.
62 The exporters usually find that their burdens lie in determining
which license is needed,63 in getting Commerce pre-approval to ship to a specific place, or in
being informed, as required under the EPCI, as to whether a product's end-user is involved
in proliferation activities. 64
D. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF EXPORT CONTROLS
Proliferation ofweapons ofmass destruction stands at the top of the list of threats to the
United States because ofthe immense costs associated with it. Hostile WMD use represents
60The U.S. Department of Commerce controls the export of dual-use items under the
Export administration Regulations (EAR). U.S. firms must consult with two separate offices
within Commerce: the Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls Office, Foreign Policy
Controls Division, BXA; and Commerce Classifications Office, Office ofExporter Services,
BXA. Export of strictly defense articles are handled by State: Office of Trade Controls and
Office of Export Control Policy, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.
61Machine tools can be both (1) and (2).
62Harvey et al., 1995, p. 72.
63Most high-technology exports require a "validated" license rather than the simpler
general license.
^Harvey et al., 1995, p. 72. President Bush set forth the Enhanced Proliferation Control
Initiative in December 1990. It required exporters to obtain government approval to ship to a
destination which they "either know or are informed" is engaged in WMD proliferation.
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a clear threat to millions of lives and billions of dollars in property. As was made clear during
the Cold War, deterring or countering a known WMD threat costs billions of dollars in
military preparations and civil defense. The bipolar arrangement between the United States
and the former Soviet Union provided decades oftension, but for many realist thinkers, it was
a relatively stable international system. The post-Cold War era involves regional and
ideological antagonism that is less well understood, and therefore unsettling for American
security planners. In such a climate, the costs associated with WMD proliferation increase
disproportionately to the number of weapons faced. That is, a relatively small number of
nuclear weapons in the hands ofNorth Koreans, Iranians, Iraqis, Libyans, or some non-state
actor (e.g., Palestinians or other political organizations) carries a higher cost to the United
States, per weapon faced, than we experienced during the Cold War against the Soviets. That
is because the level of uncertainty is higher in terms of U.S. policies and postures necessary
to deter WMD use. Thus the cost ofeach incidence ofWMD proliferation may be increasing
in the less stable post-Cold War era. To the extent that export controls can be effective in
slowing WMD proliferation, their costs to industry and exporters may be justified.
1. Benefits
The international community participates in export control regimes such as NPT, BWC,
and CWC because of consensus with the premise that, if left to unrestrained market forces,
WMD would be more cheaply and quickly acquired by those who seek them.
There would always be some structural barriers to the spread ofWMD. 65 The potential
65For example, barriers include the level of technical and industrial development ofthe
target country, the sophistication of the WMD devices sought, and the political will of the
country's leaders to include WMD as part of their search for security, power, and/or prestige.
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effectiveness of export controls involves those natural barriers. International cooperation on
the part of suppliers can make destabilizing weapons and sensitive technologies prohibitively
expensive. Access to key proprietary knowledge, learning institutions, and industrial
technicians can be blocked. On the demand side, collective security arrangements and other
diplomatic efforts can influence the target country's perceptions of its need to acquire WMD.
Also, other factors affect export control effectiveness. These include the degree of
cooperation among suppliers in multilateral regimes, the successful implementation of
enforcement policies, and the degree of general availability of dual-use items. 66 The degree
of cooperation among suppliers represents a commitment in both spirit and resources. The
participation in the multilateral rule-making is inseparable from the country's ability to pass
its own national export control legislation, then to dedicate administrative and technical
resources to the task of enforcement. At every step, the export control process can be
undermined by corruption, incompetence, light penalties against violators, and lack of
resourcing.
However, even with these weaknesses, export controls carry costs for states seeking
WMD. In particular, nuclear weapons programs require large quantities of purified
fissionable material, highly technical services and spare parts, and facilities designed for safety
and secrecy. Controls that are even partially implemented add considerable cost and trouble
to an illicit procurement effort. Therefore, even while a large number of factors can weaken




The Office of Technology Assessment suggests that it is probably impossible to quantify
or even estimate qualitatively the effects of export controls on potential proliferants in terms
of costs and delays. 68 These "costs" to proliferants represent a "benefit" to the greater
international community, and specifically to the United States. 69 However, as great as the
benefits can be portrayed, they are mostly intangible, long-term, and apply to everyone
equally. In contrast, most ofthe costs of export controls are estimable in the short-term, and
affect only selected industries, companies, and government agencies.
2. Costs
A rigorous assessment of the costs of export controls would consider both direct and
indirect costs to government, industry, and individual citizens/consumers. The requirements
of administration ofa strong control regime can be extensive, especially considering that the
goals ofU.S. export controls are broader than merely supporting nonproliferation. The often
conflicting goals of domestic and international commercial policies, as well as foreign and
67Examples of deterrence may includethe following: South Africa, where they gave up on
their nuclear weapons program after building six expensive weapons; Iraq, where the lack of
delays to its nuclear weapons programs would have dramatically altered the outcome ofDesert
Shield and Desert Storm; and Argentina and Brazil, where the slowing of their programs by
controls may have convinced them of the greater value in signing the NPT (OTA, p.25).
68OTA, 1994, p. 25.
69An exception to this situation is that of Israel, where proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology and capability seems to have been in the interests of the United States. During the
Cold War, The United States used its special relationship with Israel to counter perceived threats
from the Soviet Union and other antagonists in the Middle East. However, Israel's nuclear status
has become more problematic to the United States in its post-Cold War relations with the Arab
and greater Muslim world.
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diplomatic policies, complicate the export control process. Sorting out the priorities demands
significant administrative capital from the government to avoid unnecessary damage to
relations with either foreign governments or domestic industrial concerns. The process of
weighing options on a case-by-case basis undermines the coherence of policy. In diplomacy,
where "capital" represents trust-building, perceptions of relative power, support, and
commitment, the costs of controls are impossible to quantify or isolate.
The economic costs to exporters are more direct and quantifiable, and therefore more
contentious insofar as concrete arguments hold weight. Exporters attempt to quantify the
amount of lost business that would have been conducted in the absence of controls. Denied
export license applications give a partial measure. However, many firms assert that such a
figure does not capture the bulk of transactions avoided because firms assumed a license
would be denied. The firms also have to spend considerable amount on the tracking of and
complying with regulations. It adds to costs and products less competitive than the products
from suppliers subject to less burdensome rules. In the case ofmany smaller companies, such
as some of the most innovative in the U.S. machine tool industry, meeting the requirements
is so difficult and frustrating they do not even try to export, despite signs their products are
competitive.
From a normative perspective, most U.S. companies do not want to violate U.S. and
international nonproliferation codes because doing so brings bad publicity to their firms and
hurts sales. Therefore even in the absence of export controls, exporters of military
commodities pay attention to end-user standards. This is less clear in the case of dual-use
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machine tools, where the international codes are not built on strong consensus. 70 Producers
of dual-use technology have less normative information to use than do suppliers of nuclear
materials or weapons technologies. Therefore, the calculation of these costs is more difficult
to associate with export controls.
U.S. firms have often complained that they lose sales to other suppliers in the
multinational regimes because ofthe more stringent interpretations of the rules by the United
States government. Not only do the exporters lose the initial deals, but also any follow-on
business that may have accompanied them. This implies, again, that statistics of lost exports
via licensing data is understated. In his article, Sizing Up U.S. Export Disincentives, J. David
Richardson attempted to assess the loss of U.S. exports to other members ofCOCOM. His
findings "did not support the hypothesis that trade with COCOM partners was adversely
affected".
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Richardson also estimated that, under the COCOM regime, U.S. national security
export controls on dual-use items to communist countries cost between $4.5 and $20 billion
in 1989. His estimates for 1993 in testimony before Congress were $20-30 billion. As
COCOM has declined in relevance and authority, relaxation of controls for computers and
telecommunications products will reduce the estimates of such costs in the future.
The aggregate cost of export controls on the U.S. economy (balance of payments) is very
small. Denied license applications amounted to 0.1% of total U.S. exports in 1992. 72 In a
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Governmental Affairs and one of the most active proponents of stronger export controls for
dual-use items, the General Accounting Office stated 336,000 export licenses worth $264
billion were issued between FY 1985-92 for nuclear-related dual-use items. Of these, $29
billion worth went to 36 countries of proliferation concern. Over 24,000 licenses were
approved for exports to eight countries seeking nuclear weapons, with an overall rejection
rate to controlled countries of only one percent. 73
3. Prescriptions
Both exporters and advocates for controls want a better system for assessing and
reporting the economic impact of export controls. Impact reports should include sectoral
and product details which measure the effects of controls on U.S. direct investment, on
alliances abroad, and on foreign direct investment and alliances in the United States. 74 Use
of license application data would have to be improved to allow the breakdown of data into
component types and values. A means to compare controlled product types with data on
categories tracked by the Bureau ofthe Census may also allow more rigorous analysis. Some
means is needed to capture the value of lost or deterred business without including the heavy
bias encountered when dealing with firms' perceptions. Also, the costs of firms' internal
controls and administration add to the value of exports and must be weighed. Finally, a net
assessment of costs of controls must consider the probability and cost associated with WMD
73See the report to Sen John Glenn, Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, Export Licensing Proceduresfor Dual-Use Items Need to be Strengthened, April
1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-119.
74
See J. David Richardson, Economic Costs of U.S. Export Controls,(Washington, DC:
Statement before the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade, and Environment, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, November 18, 1993), p. 12.
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proliferation in the absence of controls. The cost-benefit analysis is desirable to all concerned,
because the data will both support the call for reforms of controls which is more in line with
the realities of the current international system, and it will provide for better monitoring of
proliferation activity.
75
75OTA, 1994, pp. 65-66.
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III. THE DUAL-USE MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY
Practically every problem concerned with the production of arms and
equipment, ships and planes, starts with the question of machine tools. The
tool builders, therefore constitute the keystone of the entire procurement
structure.
George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff during WWII. 76
A. INTRODUCTION
Machine tools are called "mother machines" because they give rise to a cascade of other
capital equipment and manufacturing processes. Most machine tools are classed as either
metal-cutting or metal-forming types. Basic functions of the former are turning, milling,
planing, shaping, drilling, boring, grinding, and sawing. The latter punch, forge, shear, draw,
and press metal in the shaping process. 77 The machine tools can be exotic, such as "the
electrolytic", "electron-discharge", and "ultrasonic" metal-cutters. They can buff, polish, and
burnish. They can extrude, file, groove, thread, slot, keyseat, and lathe. The most important
dual-use machine tools for the production of nuclear materials, weapons, and delivery systems
are the highly-precise, multiple axis, computer numerically controlled (CNC) tools.
While the industry is relatively small, it is considered critical to both the military and
76The circumstances in which Marshall made this remark are unknown. Anthony
DiFilippo, 1986, pp. 30, 37, cites First Vice President Henry D. Sharpe, Jr. of the National
Machine Tool Builders' Association as using the quote during testimony before the House Ways
and Means Committee on June 4, 1970.
77For an analysis of structural problems and decline, see Anthony DiFilippo's Military
Spending and Industrial Decline: A Study Of The American Machine Tool Industry (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1986). Also see Finegold et al., The Decline of the U.S. Machine Tool
Industry and Prospectsfor Its Sustainable Recovery, Vols. 1 & 2 (Appendices), (Santa Monica:
Rand, 1994). As DiFilippo's study is from before the end of the Cold War, and during the period
of high defense spending, it does not have the advantages of the Rand study in observing the early
stages of restructuring and improvement.
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economic security of the United States. Its health has been the subject of extensive study
during the 1980s, when it was in rapid decline, and in the 1990s, when restructuring and
recovery are taking place slowly. 78
B. THE DECLINE OF THE U.S. MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY
DiFilippo (1986) argued that high U.S. government spending on defense has hurt industry
over the years. He explains that the United States maintained a permanent war economy after
WWII, especially after the Korean War and conspicuous Soviet advances in Nuclear
capability. Government expenditures in the United States for defense, as a percent of Gross
Domestic Product, was almost 80 times that in Japan in the mid 1960s. 79 The result of this
was that the industries of other nations were less focused on military applications of their
technologies, and more concerned with commercial competitiveness. While indispensable to
defense production, the machine tool industry was not centrally located within the military-
industrial complex, as were the missile and aerospace industries. According to DiFilippo, the
government did not spend enough on machine tool R&D, and remained largely uncooperative
with the industry in regard to technological assistance for commercial applications. 80
Sporadic "military Keynesianism", marked by widely fluctuating defense expenditures,
distorted the domestic market for machine tools throughout most of the post-WWII period.
78Monthly statistics of machine tool orders represent an important indicator of capital
spending by manufacturing companies, and therefore one ofthe earliest macroeconomic indicators
of future economic activity See Raju Narisetti, "March Machine Tool Orders Rose 47%,
Highlighting Robust Capital Spending", Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1995, p. A 14.
79
DiFilippo, 1986, p. 2.
80
DiFilippo, 1986, p. 3.
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As mentioned in Chapt. I, this caused greater sensitivity to the business cycle and depressed
R&D spending further. In many respects, a war economy is the antithesis of the private
sector, because it erodes the free market forces which enhance productivity, efficiency, and
technical competence. Thus for DiFilippo, there is an inverse relationship between high long-
term defense spending in the United States and competitiveness. Resources in competitor
nations, such as Japan and West Germany, were free to R&D of civilian technologies. The
president of the National Machine Tool Builders' Association noted in 1979 that the
government of Japan "takes a very paternalistic view of the private sector to develop and
promote new exportable products through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MTU)." 81 During much of the Cold War, then, the absence of defense spending led to closer
ties between foreign governments and their countries' machine tool builders than was found
in the United States.
Another impediment to the U.S. machine tool industry, which was caused by the primacy
ofthe defense apparatus in the United States, was a heightened concern for export controls. 82
As the leader and protector of the free world, the United States placed a higher priority on
defense imperatives than other capitalist countries did. Therefore, restriction of overseas
markets and over-reliance on the fluctuating demands of the defense sector have violated
81
DiFilippo, 1986, p. 8.
82
It was in response to the growing threat posed by the Soviets that export controls were
imposed. See Mastanduno, 1992, for a description of the establishment and development of
COCOM under U.S. leadership.
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basic principles of free enterprise for the industry, and led to decline 83
C. THE U.S. MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY AND THE MILITARY: A HISTORY
OF INTERDEPENDENCE
The special relationship between the machine tool industry and the U.S. military can be
traced to arms contracts for muskets and pistols with interchangeable parts. Eli Whitney
(1798), Simeon North (1799, 1813), and John Hall (1816), employed early machine tools to
provide such arms for the young nation's arsenals. The Civil War increased machine tool
demand enormously in both the United States and Great Britain, hastening technical
improvements.
The United States machine tool industry established itself as the world quality leader in
the late 19th century, and exports sustained U.S. firms during periods of domestic economic
contraction.
84 The automobile industry eclipsed defense as the major consumer of machine
tools until WWI, when defense orders regained the lead (primarily in Europe until the United
States was committed to the war). Huge growth in sales and capacity during the war was
followed by a decline after the armistice, though the industry was buoyed somewhat by robust
automobile and aircraft sectors until the Depression.
By then the cyclical nature of the machine tool business had been frequently
demonstrated, which prevented investors from venturing capital in the industry. This reduced
the amount available for R&D, and left toolmakers less proactive in finding innovative
designs.
83The structural causes of the decline are explained in detail in DiFilippo, 1986, Chapter 3,
and in Finegold et al., 1994. pp. 15-20.
84
DiFilippo, 1986, p. 19.
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By the late 1930s, the U.S. government's orders for military aircraft and surging exports
to belligerants in Europe revitalized the industry. Also, a thriving automobile industry
benefited machine tool companies. During WWII, the foremost manufacturing sector in
America was military aircraft, which was using over 276,000 machine tools. 85 The effect of
WWII was to embed in the minds of machine tool producers the idea of a close strategic
relationship between the military sector and the machine tool industry. During WWII, they
built over one million machine tools for defense contractors. 86 Shipments increased sixfold
from 1940-1945, with the vast majority of tools sold and used domestically.
After WWII, many ofthe still new tools were not needed by the shrinking defense sector,
and there was a glut of tools on the market from both public and private sectors. The
industrial slump persisted until the Korean War. Thus the machine tool industry had become
dependent on military spending and military demand. Economic contractions in the United
States represented the greatest threat to tool sales, but were usually mitigated by exports in
the first half of the 20th Century, due to the superior quality of American tools, and the
absence of export controls. 87
D. THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF EXPORT CONTROLS ON THE MACHINE
TOOL INDUSTRY
Efforts to quantify the aggregate economic costs of controls on a specific industry have
usually depended on Department of Commerce (DOC) license application data. However,
85
DiFilippo, 1986, p. 29.
86
DiFilippo, 1986, p. 30.
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Difilippo, 1986, p. 34.
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as discussed above, companies' decisions to apply for Individual Validated Licenses (IVL) do
not capture all the effects of controls on firm's decisions and sales. The data DOC collects
is not in a form that lends itselfto analysis, since it is not possible to distinguish product types
within collective license applications. Also, Export Control Classification Numbers are not
related to other trade statistics (kept by the Bureau of the Census's export and import record
system). Thus license application data offers dubious information about impacts on specific
sectors.
88
A 1994 report prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment attempts to illustrate the
problem of using license data by focusing on the machine tool case. The report points out
that the numerically-controlled or computer-numerically -controlled (CNC) machine tools
of certain performance specifications appear on the Commerce Control List (CCL) for both
nuclear and missile nonproliferation reasons. 89 They also appear on the CCL because of the
national security reasons characterized by COCOM. That is, they were controlled for reasons
associated with economic statecraft. 90
The GAO report to Senator John Glenn entitled Export Licensing Proceduresfor Dual-
Use Items Need To Be Strengthened (1994) suggests that very few applications for exports
of dual-use machine tools are rejected by the Commerce Department. A specific example of
a license approval from late 1989 involves a military end-user in Pakistan who received two
88OTA, 1994, p. 68.
89OTA, 1994, p. 68.
90The intent ofCOCOM was to deny the Communists enabling technologies for both
weapons/military applications and for general economic development. The latter reason is still
behind much of the punitive U.S. trade policies against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.
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four-axis grinding machines capable of manufacturing critical nuclear weapons components.
In spite of being identified by the Department of Energy's Nuclear Proliferation Watch List
as engaged in "sensitive nuclear activities" (the design, manufacture, or testing of nuclear
weapons or the special nuclear material production), the customer's license was approved "on
the condition that the exporter provide the SNEC with periodic reports on the status of the
item; however, according to Commerce officials, no such reports have ever been provided." 91
The $1.5 million grinding machine sale was approved even after the SNEC recommended
blocking the end user from less valuable NRL licenses.
E. MACHINE TOOL DEMAND AND MILITARY SPENDING
While the largest consumers of U.S.-made machine tools are private sector
nonelectrical machinery, fabricated metal products, and transportation industries, the
Pentagon owns most of those in the possession of the federal government. Rather than
purchase the tools it needs to maintain and build on its materiel directly from producers, the
military works through a large network of defense contractors. Demand for machine tools
experienced clearly defined surges during the Korean conflict and the Vietnam years through
1968. However, the permanent war economy (during the Cold War) provided the industry
with constant stimulus on demand to keep the military equipped. The Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency report stated in 1969, that arms makers provide "a market for a
relatively large share ofthe annual output ofthe machine tool industry, and although machine
91SNEC=Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination, an interagency forum for reviewing
nuclear dual-use commodities. The members represent the Departments of State, Defense,
Energy, and Commerce, as well as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. See the report, Export Licensing Proceduresfor Dual-Use Items Need
To Be Strengthened, 1994.
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tools of every type are used by the government or by private contractors producing military
hardware, certain types are especially critical to military programs. "92
The interdependence of the military and the machine tool industry can be demonstrated
by comparing the military procurement spending rates in the postwar period with new orders
for tools. During the period, 1950-1978, DiFilippo found an almost perfect match in the
fluctuations ofboth trends. 1950-53 tool orders mirrored the increased Korean War defense
spending, then both declined in the recession of late 1953-55. In a graphic comparison of the
23
-year period 1956-1978, the correlation coefficient for the fluctuations in defense contract
spending vs. domestic new orders of machine tools was r=0.8191. 93 DiFilippo uses this data
to assert that the government applied military - Keynesian spending policies to help manage
the business cycle.
DiFilippo concludes that the pattern ofgovernment spending on the U.S. machine tool
industry reflected a high level of concern for the sustained competitiveness of the domestic
producers. However, he demonstrates that the close relationship between the firms to state-
supported contracts prevented them from innovating and investing in commercial research and
development. The industry is thus regarded as important, but government support had a
damaging effect during the Cold War. The Rand study reports that government spending on
high-technology consortia have helped defray costs of research and development for dual-use
technologies.
92
DiFilippo, 1986, p. 97.
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46
IV. THE CASE OF IRAQ
In Southwest Asia, the United States remains focused on deterring threats to
regional stability, particularly from Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose
a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region, and to their own
citizens.
A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement9*
It should also be recalled... that during the 1980s high-level U.S. policy was
tilting toward Iraq in its war with Iran, and it may have been Administration
political judgments ~ rather than Commerce Department zeal for export
promotion — that led to questionable license approvals.
Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-59^5
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the case of Iraq, where Saddam Hussein used a global network
ofarms and technology dealers to build a vast array of weapons programs and facilities. The
case is important because the international community won access to invaluable information
about the global trade in threatening technologies through the inspections of Iraq mandated
by the terms of the cease fire in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Many lessons are being
learned in Iraq about the inadequacies of the export control measures in the years preceding
the crisis.
Iraq remains a "rogue" state with likely intent to rebuild its WMD programs. Other
rogues, such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya, also present a WMD proliferation threat.
However, inspections and safeguards in those countries are not as invasive as in Iraq, and
much less is known about their WMD efforts.
9iA National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The
White House, February, 1995) p. 30.
95OTA, 1994, p. 36.
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In the case of Iraq, the international community must insist on maintaining long-term
monitoring of all of Iraq's nuclear and missile facilities. It must be assumed that Saddam will
continue to try to develop aWMD capability that would make him preeminent in the Middle
East. The multilateral control regimes and ongoing UN and IAEA inspections must continue
to press Iraq for information regarding those who supplied him with dual-use technology.
Networks of activities found to be operating outside of the multilaterally accepted bounds
must be curtailed, and transfers of destabilizing technologies must be blocked.
B. THE ARMING OF IRAQ
During the 1 980's, the United States favored Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War.
Iran represented the greater threat to the open sea lanes in and around the Persian Gulf. After
Ayatollah Khomeini's successful Islamic revolution, U.S. interests and those of friendly Arab
states now comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council were threatened. They depended on
Saddam to counter the threat, which he did by attacking Iran. Saddam received arms and
loans despite existing nonproliferation restrictions, partly to prevent him from leaning too far
in the direction of the Soviet Union for help.
After Iraq's cease-fire with Iran, the United States continued to provide arms,
technology and financial assistance to Saddam. The Bush administration believed it was in
the U.S. national interest to improve relations with and strengthen Saddam, as a means of
blocking both Iran and the Soviets from gaining control of Persian Gulf Oil. Therefore, the
administration approved many exports based on foreign policy goals and underemphasized
proliferation guidelines96 . This political tilt ignored the fact that, as the GCC states cut off
96
William Hartung, And Weapons For All, (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 220.
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loans to Iraq after his war with Iran, Saddam's regime became insolvent. As discussed in
more detail below, Saddam received billions of dollars in guaranteed loans from the U.S. to
finance his weapons programs — loans which the U.S. taxpayers are saddled with now.
For evidence of the administration's attempts to bypass controls, one can consider
Commerce Department records. In mid- 1993, the U.S. Commerce Department's Inspector
General reported that computer printouts of export license requests were altered in 68 cases
involving a total of $1.5 billion of high technology equipment to Iraq. The transfers occurred
prior to the GulfWar. Despite the evidence of inappropriate transfers, no one was prosecuted
for violating control rules.
97
United States government assessments suggest that during FY 1988 and 1989, 23
licenses were approved for computer equipment to end users involved in uranium enrichment
activities. Iraq is suspected to have used some of the computers to operate machine tools
used to fabricate nuclear weapons components, centrifuges, and electromagnetic uranium
enrichment equipment. "At the time these licenses were approved, only the Iraqi Atomic
Energy Commission was identified as a sensitive end user; other Iraqi state establishments
were not identified as potentially involved in nuclear weapons activities."98
However, the United States is not the only supplier Saddam used. He built a broad and
complex global network for acquiring arms and technology. Much ofthe network was secret,
both to get around the export control restrictions ofWestern countries, and to conceal the
97N. Lewis, "U.S. Decides It Won't Prosecute Case of Altered Iraq Export Papers." New
York Times, April 16, 1993, p. A10.
98See Export Licensing Proceduresfor Dual-Use Items Need To Be Strengthened", April
1994.
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identities of suppliers from Israel. Even now, as UN and IAEA inspectors attempt to uncover
the network, Iraq contends it must protect the traffickers from being killed by Israeli hit
squads." While this is possible, the more compelling motives for Saddam's reluctance to
cooperate seem to be his desire to rebuild the network and resume his weapons development
after the sanctions and embargo are lifted.
Just as the Bush Administration allegedly undermined nonproliferation control
measures to further political goals, so were the leaders of other major powers inclined to
support Saddam in his arms programs. As noted below, government involvement in Great
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan significantly helped Saddam in gaining destabilizing
technology.
C. IRAQ'S STATUS FOLLOWING DEFEAT IN 1991: INSPECTIONS AND
REBUILDING
According to many observers, the sanctions imposed on Iraq following its defeat in
1 99 1 were designed to keep Saddam from rearming, to secure full compliance with U.N.
resolutions, to end Saddam Hussein's rule, and to punish Iraq. 100 Part of the implementation
of the sanctions included extremely invasive inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). The IAEA has carried out frequent and effective inspections, but the agency
denies that it has an intelligence role. It cites three major purposes for its inspections and
operations in Iraq under U.N. Resolution 687: to destroy WMDs, to ensure Iraqi disclosure
"J. Arraf, "U.N. Nuclear Inspectors Plan 'Controversial Steps'." Reuter/Executive News
Service, January 31, 1993.
100
P. Clawson,//cw Has Saddam Hussein Survived?: Economic Sanctions, 1990-1993.
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1993), pp. 6-7.
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of its sources, and to provide for long-term monitoring of Iraqi facilities. 101 The United
Nations set up a special committee, UNSCOM, to conduct inspections on its behalf.
The sanctions have taken a heavy toll on the Iraqi economy. It is widely believed that
the sanctions have prevented Iraq from earning the hard currency required to buy dangerous
technologies. Saddam has had the option of selling approximately $1 billion of oil to purchase
badly needed food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods for his people. He has refused
to take advantage of this provision in the terms of the sanctions because he does not want to
give up any control over spending the revenues. 102 It is believed that his priority for state
spending is in his military programs.
His defiance in the face of the sanctions and inspections took a dangerous turn in
January 1993, when inspectors' flights into Iraqi airspace were essentially blocked. The U.S.
responded by bombing Saddam's military facility at Zaafarniyah (known as Al Rabee).
Inspection teams had concluded that no improper activity was occurring at Al Rabee and that
it was of negligible strategic significance, but American intelligence reports suggested
otherwise. They asserted the facility was Iraq's most advanced nuclear weapons production
plant, furnished with parts for electromagnetic separators or calutrons, used for enriching
nuclear material. U.S. officials claimed the bombing destroyed computerized, numerically
controlled (CNC) milling, grinding and turning machines which could have enabled Iraq to
101
J. Wolfsthal, "Iraq Gives IAEA Nuclear Supplier Data After Long Delay." Arms
Control Today, November, 1993, p. 21, and "Report on the 17th IAEA On- Site Inspection In
Iraq Under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)" UNSC Doc S/2541 1, March 13, 1993).
102Clawson, 1993, pp. 43.
revive its WMD program. 103
American sources reported that the bombing damaged or destroyed most of the key
buildings in the complex, including computer controlled lathes and multi-axis milling machines
from Western Europe. 104 It was believed the machinery would be impossible to replace in
light of the sanctions.
IAEA officials worried about the repercussions of the attack further hindering their
activities. The IAEA required considerable cooperation from Iraq in order to establish
long-term monitoring. 105 IAEA reports are typically more optimistic about progress, perhaps
as a diplomatic means of coaxing cooperation.
Immediately after the attack, Saddam agreed to allow the inspectors to continue with
their work. However, within two months, the facility was rebuilt, and equipment which had
been removed prior to the attack was re-installed at Al Rabee. 106 The events indicated the
resilience of Saddam's military development program in spite of sanctions and inspections.
It also pointed out Saddam's resourcefulness in safeguarding sensitive equipment. It is
believed that much ofthe technical equipment Saddam had acquired prior to the GulfWar had
103Mark Hibbs, "IAEA In 'Difficult Position' After U.S. Attack On Iraq Site," Nucleonics
Week, January 21, 1993, pp. 11-12.
104M. Healy, "Weapons Plants Inviting Targets For New Attacks." Los Angeles Times,
January 18, 1993. pp. Al, A25.
105
Hibbs, 1993. p. 12.
106
L. Barkho, "Iraq May Still Have Uranium Enrichers ~ Expert." Reuter/Executive News
Service, April 30, 1993.
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been hidden and will be available to Iraq in its plans to rearm. 107
Saddam assigned the task of preserving the facilities, presumably by converting them
to civilian use, to General Hussein Kamel Hassan, an "advisor on industry and oil." 108
Hassan's efforts had convinced the IAEA teams that none of the machinery reinstalled at Al
Rabee was being used for banned activities. Another military officer, Lt. Gen Amir Rashid,
was put in charge of protecting Iraq's most advanced production equipment from allied
bombers and UN inspectors, including CNC machine tools manufacturing centers and liquid
nitrogen plants. 109 By September 1993, The IAEA concluded that no highly enriched uranium
was left in Iraq, and the Iraqi capacity to produce it was eliminated ~ though some
acknowledgment was made that cheating could occur. 110
Given American concerns over the possibility of Iraqi "cheating", other sites were
identified as potential targets for future strikes against a defiant Saddam. Complexes at
Iskandaria, Hamath, Hatteen, Fallouja, and Nasr State Establishment contained foundries,
magnet-test facilities, calutron parts, and components of the super-gun. 111
The IAEA has sometimes suggested the sanctions be eased in recognition of Iraq's
compliance with resolutions, and as a reward in advance reward for submitting to long-term
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routine nuclear checks. Other experts fear that much ofthe estimated $12-15 billion in annual
oil revenues that Saddam would receive would go to weapons modernization programs. 112
Saddam was quick to reestablish his conventional military-industrial base, in spite of severe
hardship his policies caused among the Iraqi people. The UNSCOM chairman, Rolf Ekeus,
said international restrictions would remain until there is evidence of Iraqi "good will" with
respect to militarism, despite Iraq's acceptance of long-term monitoring as stipulated in UN
Resolution 71 5. 113
D. REVELATIONS AND ALLEGATIONS
Among the many revelations to emerge from the investigations into Saddam's sourcing
network is the key role ofAmerican financiers in assisting Iraq's arms buildup. In particular,
the role of Christopher Drogoul, manager of the Atlanta branch of Italy's Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro (BNL), has proven to be a critical link. Drogoul was Saddam's primary source
ofAmerican financing, obtaining over $4 billion in guaranteed loans and credits following the
Iran-Iraq war.
114 Drogoul alleges that the transactions were approved with the knowledge
of top-level officials in the Bush administration, as well as in the British and Italian
112
A. Borowiec, "Saddam Still Playing For Power." Washington Times. December 8,
1993, p. A13.
113
E. Leopold, "Iraq- U.N. Talks Adjourn With Arms Pact Still In Limbo." Reuter
Executive News Service, September 13, 1993, and Borowiec, December 8, 1993, and P. Lewis,
"Bowing to U.N., Iraq Will Permit Arms Monitors." New York Times, November 27, 1993, pp.
Al, A5.
mHartung, 1994. p. 227.
54
governments. 115 Some acknowledge that such conspicuous sums could not have been
approved, given Iraq's insolvency after the war, without the knowledge of highly placed
federal regulators. Drogoul testified to Congress that he was a tool of the U.S. government,
providing a conduit of resources to Iraq with the full knowledge of the CIA and the
Departments of Agriculture and State. 116 The funds were often approved as EXIM bank
loans or guaranteed loans under the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) program, but were used for the purchase of sensitive computers and
technology. 117
Investigations into the BNL scandal have been spearheaded by Congressman Henry
B. Gonzales of Texas, House Banking Committee Chairman, who has uncovered links to
several illegitimate or front companies and projects. Among them are Matrix Churchill of the
U.K., which is emerging as a key technology supplier, and XYZ Corporation of Alabama.
XYZ provided precision machine tool bits and training, allegedly for truck engines. The
tungsten carbide bits have been identified as a dual-use item employed in missile warhead
production. XYZ's technicians found themselves working in one of Iraq's major weapons
facilities at the time of the 1990-91 crisis, and had to flee the country. 118
The XYZ case is one example of Iraq's secret international projects, another being the
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Condor II missile program. Originally conceived as a joint Iraqi-Argentine-Egyptian venture
to build an improved version of Argentina's Condor ballistic missile, Iraq's partners pulled out
by 1988 Working with Drogoul for funding and billing it as the "Badush Dam" project,
Saddam attempted to develop the missile on his own. Though it was not completed before
the war, it is another case where high-level western approval was necessary for key exports,
and where political expedience seemed to play into Saddam's hands. 119
Agencies within the Congress which review license and funding requests claim they
were misled by administration reports into believing the resources were for legitimate civilian
development projects. They claim the possible military uses of the technologies were
excluded from the reports, and they did not have adequate information on which to review
the dual-use cases properly. 120 They suggest the restriction mechanisms built into the U.S.
export controls were bypassed for reasons of foreign policy.
Other revelations include the roles of a long list of states in contributing to the
procurement network. Among them are Russia, Algeria, Jordan, Germany, Japan, France,
and the United Kingdom.
Russia is believed to have provided vast amounts of nuclear material and scientific
knowledge. With its struggling economy, the arms trade is seen as a major source of currency
and an outlet for its glut of highly-trained scientists. 121 Russia's involvement in the multilateral
119Hartung, 1994. p. 230.
120W. Carley, "Who Let Whom Arm Iraq?" Wall Street Journal, January 6, 1994, p. A10.
121K Belyaninov, "Nuclear Expertise, Materials Export Feared." Proliferation Issues,
March 5, 1993, p. 21.
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export control regimes has been peripheral as it has transitioned to a market economy.
Current revisions of multilateral efforts stress the close involvement of Russia in
nonproliferation and call for stronger national rules in Yeltsin's government to control
exports.
Algeria is believed to be supporting Saddam's nuclear weapons program by hiding
critical equipment, materials, and personnel from the IAEA. Algeria has itself applied for
more active status in the nuclear community, and is feared as a possible future proliferator.
This status is believed to be the result of collusion with Saddam. 122
Jordan, as Saddam's friendliest neighbor, is also believed to have provided a large
number of front companies to the procurement network. Once equipment arrives in Jordan,
it passes easily across the border into Iraq.
Germany is now seen as the worst violator of controls designed to restrict weapons
and military-specific materials destined for WMD programs to Iraq, as well as providing the
most advanced centrifuge technology. The numbers of centrifuge parts sold was insufficient
for Iraq's needs, but design information provided by Bruno Stemmler through H&H
Metalform, and by Karlheinz and Brigitte Schaab ofRo-Sch GmbH, is believed to be highly
sensitive and remains in Iraqi hands and heads. 123 The cases have resulted in legislation
122
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strengthening the German Foreign Trade Act. 124 German firms also provided high grade
maraging steel, hot isostatic presses and precision pump equipment. 125
Japan has also strengthened its national export control legislation, after it was revealed
that several firms provided Saddam with precision tools. Given the close relationship between
industry and government ministries in Japan, the roles of state officials in the transfers have
been questioned. 126
France has historically been an eager supplier of arms to Iraq. Its Skiaky firm built at
least five electron beam welders at the Al Rabiya site and elsewhere, machines which are
considered key to the production of gas ultra-centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium. 127
While it also has reviewed its role in arming Saddam and the degree of its compliance with
controls under nonproliferation agreements, France has been among the first to reopen offices
in Iraq for trade contracts in anticipation of the lifting of the embargo.
Great Britain has endured a very embarrassing scandal involving the Matrix Churchill
multinational corporation, essentially owned by Iraq. Its CEO, acting as an informant for
British intelligence MI6, implicated senior Foreign Office officials, including its Minister of
State, William Waldegrave. Even Prime Minister Thatcher allegedly undermined her country's
124Mark Hibbs, "Bundestag to Seek Iraq Briefing In Light OfNew Baghdad-IAEA Data."
Nuclear Fuel. December 6, 1993, p. 9.
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127
"G7 To Tighten Controls." MeaNews, January 1 1, 1993. pp. 4-5.
58
export control laws to arm Saddam with threatening technologies. Some of the accused
argue that the military use ofthe exports was hidden from them. At the same time, they note
that the guidelines and policies were reinterpreted in Iraq's case, requiring the government to
prove intended military end use if it wanted to block export of the dual-use items. The
Ministers asserted it was commonly assumed Saddam would focus on his civilian industries
after the long and costly war with Iran. 128 Proof of military use was considered a waste of
time. Later, Thatcher's aides claimed she approved sales of millions of pounds sterling worth
of machine tools to prevent the compromise of intelligence activities if the deal failed. 129
According to the IAEA, Matrix Churchill supplied Iraq with 13 of the 47 most vital
pieces of equipment used in the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. 130 Many key figures sought
for information in the case, including both British and Iraqi officials and scientists, were killed
before they could provide evidence. 131
Among the Western scientists who sold his knowledge of advanced weapons systems
to Saddam was Dr. Gerald Bull. He helped Saddam's defense and industrial chiefs establish
production facilities in the Iraqi desert and in the zones south ofBaghdad. His association
with Iraq's WMD programs eventually cost him his life, possibly at the hands of Mossad
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September 15, 1993.
129
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agents, but not before he designed a "supergun" cannon for Saddam, intended to threaten the
State of Israel. Bull's case is of interest because he assisted in the procurement of dual-use
machine tools, in violation of export control restrictions.
Gerald Bull believed that the Iraqis were at least ten years from nuclear weapons while
he was working for them. He thought they would equip any missile he worked on with a
conventional high explosive warhead.
Bull needed cones for his missiles as well as a supply of carbon fiber material. To get
what he required, he supported the establishment of a network involving the Baghdad-based
Al-Arabi Trading company, under the control of Hussein Kamil, minister of industry and
military industrialization. It was Kamil who was charged with perfecting nuclear weapons and
their ballistic missile delivery systems for Saddam. Al-Arabi Trading bought Technology
Development Group (TDG), a British holding company, in 1987. Immediately, TDG bought
Matrix-Churchill, a manufacturer of computer-controlled lathes. 132
From 1987-88, Matrix supplied Iraq with three orders worth 19 million pounds
sterling, then contracted to establish a high technology die-forging plant in Iraq for 26 million
pounds. The projects were financed through BNL-Atlanta. 133 Some lathes turned up at the
military-industrial complexes at Al-Hillah and Saad-16 south of Baghdad, for making
weapons designed by Bull. Dr. Bull also helped Iraq set up front companies in Europe to buy
restricted parts necessary to build its own gas centrifuges, devices that transform non-
132See W. Lowther, Arms and the Man: Dr. Gerald Bull, Iraq and the Supergun. New
York: Ivy Books, 1991, p. 210.
133Lowther, 1991, p. 211.
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enriched uranium ore into Uranium 235 ~ the basis of nuclear bombs. 134
E. THE CONTINUING THREAT
Inspectors have compared their inventories of equipment found in Iraq to export
records of suppliers and have identified many discrepancies. They suggest the equipment
unaccounted for is hidden, and either in use in secret underground facilities or in storage. 135
Experts from IAEA and UNSCOM agree that Saddam can rebuild quickly and must be
closely watched. His intent to develop WMDs is a clear and present danger to the stability
ofthe region. The international community has the advantage in the case of Iraq of continued
access and monitoring. That advantage is not there with the other rogue states: Libya, Iran,
and North Korea. It has been made quite clear that the international arms and technology
network is extensive, efficient, and largely invisible. As the United States and other nations
attempt to negotiate new cooperative arrangements in the new world order, they consider
ways to win friends and build leverage through increased trade and technology transfers.
Optimistic actors in the international scene point to the advantages of broadening democracy
and industrial development worldwide, while thawing relations with former adversaries.
There is always pressure to respond to civil overtures on the part of rehabilitated regimes with
assistance. For example, the IAEA foresees a legitimate Iraqi nuclear power program which
will require the installation and use of sensitive equipment. 136 This climate can, as seen in the
case of Iraq, lead to proliferation of threatening technology. The safeguards embodied in
134Lowther, 1991, p. 209.
135
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standard IAEA inspections may not be adequate to prevent their development ofweapons.
Long-term, rigorously intrusive monitoring is called for, but will always be a source of bitter
resentment by the Iraqi people and leadership.
F. PRESCRIPTIONS
There are many lessons for the improvement of the export control system which have
been learned from the Iraqi case. The global character ofthe international arms trade requires
a high level of cooperation among supplier countries to stem proliferation. Multilateral
regimes are the best hope for slowing the spread ofthreatening materials, but not all countries
are able to track sales and end users. The concerted sharing of information via computer
networks can alert the international community to suspicious programs. To achieve a
comfortable balance between security concerns and exporters' freedom to compete, sales
should be considered on a case-by-case basis. Greatest attention goes to attempts by rogue
states to acquire sensitive items. Dual-use equipment in particular should be regulated with
flexible but coordinated policies.
That coordination must occur within the responsible agencies of each country as well.
For example, in the United States, the decision to approve licenses must be routed efficiently
through the bureaucracies of the Departments of State, Commerce, Energy, and Defense
(such as the Defense Technology Security Agency), as well as through the appropriate
Congressional and Banking regulators. This includes close contacts with industry and private
financial institutions to ensure information is up to date. Since each agency is traditionally
inclined to favor or reject actions based on its own parochial interests, a more objective
system of assessment must be found to weigh the potential costs and benefits of exports. This
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equation must determine which technologies are sensitive and why, which are destabilizing
to the customer's regional security, and how to ensure the legitimacy of the final use.
The international regime, led by the U.S., provides a guide for the improvement of
national export controls in other countries. 137 Therefore, credible unilateral measures should
be regarded as important precursor arrangements to be emulated, copied, and eventually
incorporated internationally.
In addition to the transfer oftechnology, the training of foreign students, officers, and
scientists in western schools must be closely regulated. There have been many cases of
technicians studying in the United States and applying their skills in the weapons facilities of
Iraq. It can be assumed that exchange programs in both the West and in the former Soviet
Union involving Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, China, Russia, Argentina, Pakistan, India,
and South Africa have provided a pool of talent for rogue regimes. 138
In Iraq, the international community must continue to pressure Saddam to comply with
U.N. resolutions, including submitting to long-term monitoring and divulging all sources. The
stability of the region may require a strong Iraq to counter Iran, but the regime is much too
unpredictable to be trusted. The IAEA may work for a legitimate civilian nuclear power
program in Iraq, but not until means are in place to prevent nuclear weapons development.
Much of the responsibility for preventing WMD programs in Iraq rests with responsible
exporters and clear export control measures, practiced and enforced multilaterally.
137M. Tachinardi, "Congress Urged To Approve Dual-Purpose Military Goods BilL"
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American leadership in the world has never been more important, for there is
a simple truth about this new world: the same idea that was under attack
three times in this Century — first by imperialism and then by fascism and
communism — remains under attack today, but on many fronts at once. . . Our
struggle today, in a world more high-tech, more fast moving, more chaotically
diverse than ever, is the age-old fight between hope and fear.
A National Security Strategy ofEngagement andEnlargement1 *9
Trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to
the public, does what affects the interests of other persons, and of society in
general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of
society.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859. 140
A. IMPLICATIONS
The threat to U.S. interests of proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD)
has increased during the post-Cold War era due to globalization of defense technology
industries. Difiusion of sensitive dual-use technologies, including advanced precision machine
tools, contributes to proliferation. Reform ofunilateral export controls and the establishment
of a multilateral control regime to succeed the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (COCOM) are both necessary, but must complement each other to be
effective.
It is not feasible for the United States to withdraw from multilateral arrangements and
apply controls unilaterally. Foreign availability of advanced technologies, together with a lack
of consensus regarding the modalities of multilateral controls, render unilateral controls
139A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, (Washington, DC: The
White House, February 1995), pp. 1-2.
140Quoted from Proliferation Watch, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
September-October 1993, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 1.
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damaging to U.S. exporters without slowing the spread ofWMD.
Export controls involve a tradeoff between nonproliferation goals and economic
competitiveness of U.S. industries. Both WMD spread and the health of commercial
technology sectors concern national security, as the United States strives to maintain a
qualitative edge on the battlefield. This thesis frames the arguments in the
nonproliferation-competitiveness debate. It suggests there is common ground between the
exporters and proponents of export controls; the United States must assume the hegemonic
role of principled leader in the multilateral control regime. It must push for consensus on the
modalities of controls (commodities and technologies subject to controls as well as an outline
of governing rules). This requires a more rigorous and nuanced means of assessing the costs
and benefits of specific controls. Also, the United States must push for a clear statement of
criteria and responsibilities ofmember states to avoid free rider behavior. The successor to
COCOM must involve the formerly targeted communist states and use positive incentives to
compel more states to eschew proliferation activity. Furthermore, the United States must use
its intelligence and information technologies to lead the effort to monitor proliferation activity
and enforce rules. As the multilateral regime results in wider access to technology and
developmental capital for members, and damaging isolation for targets states, proliferation
activity may decrease, and the commercial market for civilian end-users will develop and
expand.
This thesis examines the case of Iraq, where highly intrusive inspections and
monitoring following the GulfWar have yielded valuable information about Saddam Hussein's
global procurement network for his WMD programs. The case provides evidence for the
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argument that export controls can be undermined by short-sighted political decisions, carrying
the danger of arming a rogue state. Inspections have revealed the key role of computer
numerically-controlled (CNC) machine tools in the development ofWMD programs. They
are necessary for the enrichment of fissile materials and for the building of precision
components of missiles, aircraft, and other devices. Saddam's WMD programs focused on
the procurement of machine tools to give him an indigenous development and production
capability. Much of his inventory of tools may have survived the war and the inspection
process, reducing the time and resources necessary to revive his WMD efforts once sanctions
are lifted.
Prescriptions call for strong controls on a limited list of sensitive technologies, and firm
policies against rogue behavior. A more sophisticated monitoring and information-sharing
network is needed to track proliferation patterns. The United States must ensure positive
incentives are made part of the rules, as in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to draw states
into a verifiable, cooperative posture with regard to nonproliferation. Firm but fair leadership
of multilateral efforts must reflect the position of the United States as the world's sole
superpower.
B. TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis argues for a strong hegemonic role for the United States in The New
Forum. Unfortunately, this successor regime to COCOM has experienced many delays in
becoming established, largely because of a lack of international consensus for rules and
modalities. The United States has been unable to lead effectively the negotiations to set up
The New Forum, because our own debates about the costs and benefits of export controls for
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dual-use technologies in the post Cold-War era have lacked objective analysis.
Serious work on the quantification of the costs to exporters of controls is required,
along with the operationalization of the benefits of nonproliferation. This will serve to
eliminate much of the bias in perspective and values among exporters and proponents of
strong controls for nonproliferation goals, and provide an objective basis for comparing both
sides of the cost-benefit-risk equation.
Since export controls are only effective in slowing, and not in stopping, the spread of
sensitive commodities, an effective network of information-sharing and monitoring must be
established. Research on the feasibility of open-source, i.e., commercial, intelligence
collection must be conducted to determine corporate and legal requirements. The data-
sharing network being developed for the Nuclear Suppliers Group will provide important
insights and lessons to the dual-use Forum for monitoring purposes.
This study focused on the case of Iraq in order to emphasize the proven potential for
proliferation by an "emerging rogue" regime. The evidence suggests other states with
aspirations for regional hegemony, power, and prestige, or who see themselves sufficiently
threatened, will pursue WMD programs and by-pass existing trade controls. Investigative
research into proliferant activity must continue, both from a demand side and a supply side.
It is especially critical in this new era, given the heightened incentives to transfer technology
for badly-needed foreign currency by the struggling former Soviet states.
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